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ABSTRACT 
In Shame and Necessity, Bernard Williams engages in a forceful vindication of the ethical 
significance of shame. In his view, shame is an extremely productive moral emotion because of 
the distinctive connection that it establishes between self, others and world, through a self-
evaluation that is mediated by an internalized other. In this paper, I examine Williams’ 
conception of the internalized other and contrast it with other ways of conceiving the role of 
others in shame. I argue that, although Williams’ views contain many important insights, much 
is to be gained by conceiving the role of others in Sartrean terms instead. The other’s 
perspective is not merely internalized; it is constitutive of the kind of selfhood that has a 
capacity for shame.  
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Introduction 
 
In Shame and Necessity, Bernard Williams engages in a forceful vindication of the 
ethical significance of shame. In his view, shame is an extremely productive moral 
emotion because of the distinctive connection that it establishes between self, 
others and world, through a self-evaluation that is mediated by an internalized 
other. In this paper, I examine Williams’ conception of the internalized other and 
contrast it with other ways of conceiving the role of others in shame. I argue that, 
although Williams’ views contain many important insights, much is to be gained 
by conceiving the role of others in Sartrean terms instead. It allows us to better 
understand the experience of shame and its moral significance. In Sartre’s account 
of shame, the other’s perspective is not merely internalized; it is constitutive of 
the kind of selfhood that has a capacity for shame. According to this view, the role 
of others in shame is at the same time thinner and more fundamental than the one 
advocated by Williams. It is thinner, because it does not presuppose the learning 
or endorsement of any substantial set of values and norms in order to feel shame. 
But it is also more fundamental, because it makes the relation with others, or 
rather, the capacity for it (relationality), constitutive of the self that can feel 
shame. This means that the structure of relationality is prior to any 
internalization of norms, and it establishes the ground for shame to become an 
emotion informed by norms and standards. 
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This paper starts by sketching a fairly typical definition of shame according to 
the relevant literature, a description that is in line with Williams’ own account of 
this emotion. In order to clarify why he postulates the notion of an internalized 
other to explain shame, I take a step back and analyze the role of others in shame 
by contrasting it to other emotions in the same family, which shows that 
audiences are not necessary for shame. The question then arises: what is the role 
of others in shame? The following section returns to Williams’ views on this 
matter, and specifically to his hypothesis of the internalized other. In the final 
section, I discuss my own Sartrean view and argue in its favor. 
Shame 
 
Among emotion researchers from various disciplines, the word ‘shame’ is often 
used in at least two senses. Some use ‘shame’ to refer to an “affect,” i.e. a hard-
wired, innate response,1 that underlies a whole family of hedonically negative self-
conscious emotions, including embarrassment, humiliation and some types of 
guilt. Many others use it to refer to a specific emotion belonging to this family. I 
will be using it in this latter sense, and comparing it to other related emotions in 
the following section, while retaining the idea that all these emotions form an 
inter-related family.  
Shame as an individual emotion is characterized by a feeling of exposure, 
inferiority and vulnerability. Typical bodily manifestations include blushing, 
averting the gaze, adopting a collapsed bodily position and so on: in shame, one 
feels smaller or wishes to become smaller and hide from view. In the relevant 
literature, shame has been described through several labels: a self-conscious 
emotion, an emotion of self-assessment, a social emotion or a moral emotion. It 
has been labeled as a “self-conscious emotion” because it is directed back at 
myself: the intentional object of the emotion is the individual that feels it, not the 
situation or action which gives rise to the shame episode. In shame, I focus on 
myself and see myself as small, faulty or inadequate. As such, it has also been 
called an “emotion of self-assessment” because it involves a negative self-
evaluation.2 This negative self-assessment can be due both to active and passive 
aspects of selfhood: to actions and omissions of all kinds (lying to a friend, acting 
or speaking against one’s values in order to maintain status in a particular social 
group), to things that befall us (victims of abuse typically feel it), to character 
traits, physical features, social background and so on.  
The label “social emotion” refers to another key aspect of shame: exposure. 
Many authors claim that shame is a response to being exposed to the censoring 
gaze of a real, an imagined or an internalized audience.3 The unpleasantness of 
                                                          
1 Cf. e.g. Elison, ‘Shame and Guilt.’ 
2 Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt. 
3 Cf. e.g. Williams, Shame and Necessity; Maibom, ‘The Descent of Shame.’ 
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exposure of a negative trait would explain why in shame we often experience a 
wish to hide and disappear from the view of others. However, the connection of 
shame to exposure to an actual external gaze or judgment is a rather controversial 
point, and this is what this paper focuses on. Finally, the label “moral emotion” 
mostly refers to its role in mechanisms of self-censorship and regulation of 
behavior according to norms or standards. This paper deals mainly with the social 
aspects of shame, but the other dimensions will come to the fore, especially the 
moral one, which was of special interest to Williams. 
 
Shame and audiences 
 
According to Williams, shame is an unequivocally social emotion. Now, to say 
that shame is social amounts to much more than saying that we learn the codes 
and standards of what is shameful from other people, that those standards are 
encoded in culture, or that shame serves social functions. As social psychologists 
Hareli and Parkinson4 and philosophers Deonna, Rodogno and Teroni5 explain, 
these claims are obviously true, but they do not tell us anything especially 
interesting about shame in particular, or even social emotions in general. They are 
far too broad to distinguish shame and the like from other, non-social, emotions, 
because all human emotions are partially governed and shaped by cultural codes 
and most of them serve social functions.6 Characterizing shame as social implies 
attributing to others a specific crucial role that is not exhaustively covered by the 
above general assertions. So what role do others play in shame? 
In order to pin this role down, it is helpful to divide the possible answers into a 
taxonomy devised by Deonna, Rodogno and Teroni.7 They identify three different 
strands of the claim that shame is social: (i) shame as heteronomous, i.e., informed 
by values that do not belong to the ashamed subject, but to other people; (ii) 
shame as involving “an evaluation in terms of one’s appearance vis-à-vis an 
audience”; (iii) shame as the result of adopting an external perspective on 
ourselves.8 In short, others can provide the values, the gaze or the perspective. 
Williams, for his part, falls within the second strand: for him (and many others) 
the negative self-assessment of shame is triggered by the disapproving evaluation 
of an audience. But would he not fall within the first strand too? After all, what 
exactly causes my shame? The gaze of the other or her evaluation of me? Williams 
maintains that both are important, by arguing that this audience is an internalized 
                                                          
4 Hareli and Parkinson, ‘What’s Social About Social Emotions?’ 
5 Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni, In Defense of Shame. 
6 Cf. Hareli and Parkinson, ‘What’s Social About Social Emotions?’, 132–37; Deonna, Rodogno, 
and Teroni, In Defense of Shame, chap. 1. 
7 Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni, In Defense of Shame, 32–37. 
8 They disagree with all three strands and offer a thought-provoking non-social account of 
shame, which I cannot engage with here. 
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other with very specific characteristics: it is, as we will see, a respected other. This 
dampens the heteronomy of shame to a very large extent. But how does Williams 
come to this conclusion? Let me spell out some of the considerations at play. 
The first consideration is that, if shame requires an audience, it cannot 
possibly be an actual audience that is present in all instances of shame. After all, it 
is not difficult to think about examples of shame felt in solitude, when we think 
about our failures (even those that nobody else knows about), or when we 
remember certain past situations. This can be seen more clearly by comparing 
shame with embarrassment.  
One might think that embarrassment is merely a mild form of shame, and 
indeed the two emotions are related, but there is an important experiential 
difference between them. Shame clearly concerns our sense of self; it burdens us 
with an “unwanted identity”9 and impacts our self-esteem and self-respect.10 As 
Williams brilliantly put it, shame helps us “understand how a certain action or 
thought stands to ourselves, to what we are and to what realistically we can want 
ourselves to be.”11  
Embarrassment does not seem to have this impact, and empirical studies have 
confirmed this.12 Nussbaum points out the differential features of embarrassment, 
as opposed to shame: although both typically take the subject by surprise, 
embarrassment is “momentary, temporary and inconsequential,” while shame 
lasts longer and is more serious.13 This is the case, according to Nussbaum, because 
embarrassment does not involve, like shame, a sense of being flawed and 
defective, but merely a sense that something is socially out of place (marked social 
attention, often in the form of praise, can cause embarrassment). As such, it is 
social and contextual; it always requires an actual audience in front of which we 
are performing awkwardly. Solitary shame is possible, since one can feel faulty or 
inadequate when thinking about one’s flaws ore remembering one’s failures, but 
solitary embarrassment (a solitary feeling of social awkwardness) makes no sense. 
The audience may turn out not to be there - perhaps you simply mistakenly 
thought that someone had seen or heard you - but it must be part of the story. 
And as soon as we are on our own, or we have ascertained that there was nobody 
looking or listening, embarrassment disappears without leaving a feeling of 
degradation. We typically feel embarrassed in front of others of things that do not 
embarrass us when we are alone, such as bodily functions, or of failures that are 
conceivable as such only because others are present, such as telling a joke that 
nobody else finds funny. This need not be the case in shame, which often concerns 
                                                          
9 Ferguson, Eyre, and Ashbaker, ‘Unwanted Identities.’ 
10 Cf. e.g. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, para. 67; Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt; Deigh, ‘Shame 
and Self-Esteem.’ 
11 Williams, Shame and Necessity, 93. 
12 Cf. Miller, Embarrassment, 22–28. 
13 Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity, 204–5. 
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flaws that are perceived as more permanent and much less dependent on the social 
context. 
A good example of solitary shame can be found in the passages of Anna 
Karenina that describe her return to St. Petersburg from Moscow, where she has 
just met the dashing Vronsky.14 She sits alone in the train, with no audience, 
trying to fight her intense and anguishing shame by telling herself that her 
behavior to Vronsky was proper, that she did not betray her husband and nobody 
can blame her for anything. It is clear, however, that she does not dare to admit, 
even to herself, that a respectable and decent married woman like herself could 
have fallen in love with a dashing young officer like Vronsky. But who is the 
audience that is assessing her here in light of her unacknowledged feelings? And 
how to explain that she felt no shame at the party, while flirting and dancing with 
Vronsky in front of the high society of Moscow, and she only comes to feel it while 
she sits alone in the train?  
This contrast between the two moments might lead one to think that 
audiences are irrelevant to eliciting shame: all Anna Karenina had to do was 
adopt a different perspective on herself and the situation. This might seem even 
clearer in an example proposed by Goldie in a different context:15 a man gets 
drunk at an office party, he climbs on top of a table and starts singing “Love is 
like a butterfly” at the top of his voice. At the time, in his drunkenness, he may 
have only been enjoying the music and the general merriment, but when he 
remembers the episode the next morning, he will see the situation in a different 
light, he will realize that his colleagues were laughing at him and not with him, 
and only then feel ashamed of himself. This would seem to indicate that the gazes 
of others, even when coupled with their mockery, are insufficient to cause shame: 
something is needed on the part of the subject as well, a change of perspective on 
himself. But does this completely rule out the need for an audience? Both Anna 
Karenina and the man in Goldie’s example exposed themselves publicly before an 
audience, and felt ashamed of themselves in solitude when they re-examined the 
situation, so the audience was a part of their memories. These examples might 
therefore suggest that both the audience and the change of perspective are 
necessary. 
Furthermore, one might want to argue that the essential element is the 
negative evaluation of others: the man at the office party only becomes ashamed 
in the morning, because only then does he realize that his colleagues found him 
ridiculous. Similarly, Anna Karenina was engrossed with Vronsky and caught up 
in the excitement of falling in love with him at the party; while only in the train 
did she have enough distance from the excitement to realize what others must 
                                                          
14 Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, pt. 1, ch. 24. 
15 Goldie, The Mess Inside, 38–39. 
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have been thinking about them. This might suggest, then, that the actual 
presence of others is unnecessary, but their evaluations are not.  
Even so, it would be a mistake to argue that the awareness that others 
evaluate me negatively constitutes shame. This would amount to conflating the 
emotion of shame with what I would call “objective” shame, i.e., the verdict of 
society on what is shameful, or disgrace. Disgrace is not an emotion, but a 
condition. In the Online Oxford English Dictionary, it is defined as follows: “loss 
of reputation or respect as the result of a dishonourable action … [In singular] a 
person or thing regarded as shameful and unacceptable.”16 A similar definition can 
be found in the Merriam Webster’s Dictionary: “1a: the condition of one fallen 
from grace or honor; b: loss of grace, favor, or honor. 2: a source of shame.”17 
Disgrace is, therefore, not an affective phenomenon, but a “social attribute,” i.e., 
an objective state, or a thing that can cause such a state. But the objective state 
of disgrace does not always necessarily cause shame: social attributes, codes and 
verdicts do not shape our experience of shame in a necessary and inescapable 
way.18 Shamelessness is possible and comes in many forms, including immorality 
and moral reformism.19 One may feel ashamed of things that are not disgraceful, 
and conversely, one may be in a state of disgrace in one’s society and not feel 
ashamed. One may argue that this is at some point the case of all moral reformers 
who actively criticize with the ways of life and the codes of shame and honor in 
their societies: think about Diogenes the Cynic, Jesus Christ and the sexual 
revolution, for example.20 The possibility to resist the external verdict and 
respond to disgrace with defiance and even pride indicates that the external 
evaluation is also insufficient to cause shame.  
What is then required for shame to arise? Sartre writes that “my shame is a 
confession”: in the moment of shame, I am endorsing the evaluation of 
unworthiness or inadequacy.21 Through shame I confess my “sin”, I confess that I 
am thus and so. Deonna, Rodogno and Teroni argue that this is the central 
element.22 They view shame as a negative self-evaluation in terms of my own self-
relevant values, where no reference to the other is necessary. According to them, if 
I assess that I’m not capable of exemplifying my own self-relevant values, I will 
feel shame regardless of what others think or see in me. Their work yields a crucial 
insight: that my own values and perspective also play an important role in 
                                                          
16 Oxford Dictionaries Online. April 2010. Oxford University Press (accessed February 21, 
2012). My emphasis. 
17 "disgrace." Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, 2013. Web. 12 December 2013. 
18 Yovel, ‘The Birth of the Picaro from the Death of Shame’, 1299. 
19 Hutchinson, ‘Facing Atrocity.’ 
20 Cf. ibid. for an interesting discussion of cases of shamelessness and their meaning; also 
Calhoun, ‘An Apology for Moral Shame.’ 
21 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 261. 
22 Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni, In Defense of Shame. 
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eliciting shame, but in my view they go too far. Evidence from empirical 
psychology seems to suggest that the role of audiences is crucial for intensifying 
and eliciting shame experiences.23 Furthermore, looking at developmental 
psychology, it seems clear that all experiences of self-conscious emotion first 
appear in infants in the presence of audiences, which indicates that shame felt 
before others is much more primary than solitary shame.24 Solitary shame 
depends on self-reflectivity and a well-developed self-concept, but not all shame is 
like this. Therefore, an account of shame that only accords a peripheral role to 
others seems to be missing something important.25 
 
The internalized other 
 
Let me now turn to Williams’ account of the role of others in shame. He is very 
well aware of the complexities of the issue that I addressed above, and in order to 
do justice to them, he (along with many other authors) defends the idea that 
shame is caused by the internalization of an audience, which doesn’t necessarily 
involve explicitly imagining or remembering the audience every time.26 Williams 
agrees to a large extent with Wollheim’s Freudian account, which explains shame 
as caused by the introjection of an external authority figure, which becomes an 
internal “criticizing agency,” or superego, that judges and censors the ego.27 Freud 
believed that the superego starts to emerge around the fifth year of life, as a result 
of the child’s internalization of the parents’ moral standards through education.28 
For Freud, small children cannot feel shame, but during the developmental stage 
that he calls “sexual latency,” a transition stage that goes approximately from 3 
to 7 years of age (but may be longer or shorter depending on various 
circumstances), several “dams” are built that restrict and block the flow of sexual 
drive. These obstacles are shame, disgust and morality.29 They arise as a form of 
self-protection, against a feared parental figure. According to Freud’s theory of 
the Oedipus complex, the little boy phantasizes his father as threatening him with 
castration due to the boy’s sexual desire for his mother. Then, in Wollheim’s 
words, “in terror, the boy introjects the father, thereby exchanging a frightening 
external danger for enduring internal torment. The superego now harangues, 
upbraids, chastises the boy according to standards that make no allowances for, 
                                                          
23 Smith et al., ‘The Role of Public Exposure in Moral and Nonmoral Shame and Guilt.’ 
24 Cf. Rochat, Others in Mind; Reddy, How Infants Know Minds. 
25 Cf. Zahavi, ‘Self, Consciousness, and Shame.’ 
26 Cf. e.g. Williams, Shame and Necessity; Maibom, ‘The Descent of Shame.’ 
27 Wollheim, On the Emotions. 
28 ‘Superego | Psychology.’ 
29 Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 43, 58; see also Metcalf, ‘The Truth of Shame-
Consciousness in Freud and Phenomenology.’ 
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indeed often expressly run counter to, the boy’s own wishes.”30 Due to this 
developmental history, this introjected figure possesses both authority and 
heteronomous force:  
 
[I]t is because internal figures originate, through an incorporative phantasy, 
from external figures, that, once they have been internalized, they may well 
continue to address the person who now harbors them as an alien force. They 
may set themselves to make the person feel shame or guilt on occasions when 
the person finds no reason to do so.31 
 
Now, Williams does not make any claims about the developmental history of 
the internalized other, but he agrees that it possesses an authority that is related 
to its otherness, just like the superego does. But he makes a small observation 
here. On Wollheim’s account, shame would share the same psychoanalytic origin 
as guilt: they would both be the result of different kinds of indictments by the 
superego. According to Williams, however, the figures that are internalized in 
these emotions are different, at least in terms of their perspectives and roles: in 
shame the internalized other would play the role of an observer or a witness, and 
in guilt, the role of a victim or a judge.32 The shaming audience, in any case, 
would be an element of our psyche, something we acquire and internalize as 
children, and that accompanies us throughout our lives, monitoring our emotions 
and behavior. Shame in these kinds of accounts is essentially in all cases a 
consciousness of exposure to the censoring gaze of another. 
Now, this other cannot just be a literal copy of one’s actual father and his 
values and norms, since people can come to be ashamed of their fathers (or their 
mothers, or their educators) for holding and cherishing values that they later 
repudiate. But on the other hand, it is also problematic to assume that the 
internalized other can simply be a placeholder for any observer, since not every 
observer, witness or judge can make us feel ashamed. Williams argues, for 
example, that we typically are not ashamed to be evaluated negatively by people 
we despise. In his view, therefore, the internalized audience is someone we respect.  
To illustrate this, Williams employs the tragedy of Ajax by Sophocles. He 
quotes Ajax’ suicide speech, where the Greek hero wonders how he can face his 
father after covering himself in shame.33 This is not a purely rhetorical device: it 
points to something deep. Indeed, in the tragedy, Ajax is surrounded by people 
who express support and love for him, and do not condemn him: his servants and 
his wife. But he is a warrior, it is his honor as a warrior that is at stake, and those 
                                                          
30 Wollheim, On the Emotions, 195–96. 
31 Ibid., 178–79. 
32 Williams, Shame and Necessity, 219–223, Appendix I. 
33 Ibid., 85; Sophocles, Sophocles II, Ajax, 462 seq. 
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views have no value for him in that context, no relevant impact on his sense of 
who he is. They have no power to counter the fact that he would feel deep shame 
in front of his (absent) father Telamon, who as a young man had been a brave and 
celebrated warrior. For Williams, however, in contrast to Wollheim, the crucial 
point is not that Telamon happens to be Ajax’s father. What is essential is that 
Telamon functions, according to Williams, as the anchoring point that symbolizes 
the world where Ajax wants to live and the identity he wants to preserve (in this 
sense, his brother Teucer or his admired Achilles would have done just as well). 
Ajax is aware that the things that we do and do not do impact on who we are; 
that the world has certain expectations that must be fulfilled in order for us to 
possess and retain certain identities; that our identities, in short, are not under our 
exclusive control. In Ajax’ case, his final monologue expresses that if he cannot 
command the respect of his father and men of similar position, worth and 
accomplishments, he cannot keep his identity as an honorable warrior, or his self-
respect. In Williams’ account, the internalized other always points towards the 
world I (want to) live in and its expectations of me: 
 
The internalised other is indeed abstracted and generalised and idealised, but 
he is potentially somebody rather than nobody, and somebody other than me. 
He can provide the focus of real social expectations, of how I shall live if I act 
in one way rather than another, of how my actions and reactions will alter my 
relations to the world about me.34 
 
As such, what is crucial about the internalized other is that it commands our 
respect and functions as the reference point and limit to our possibilities in the 
world.35 The fact that, according to Williams, respect is required implies that 
there is a degree of autonomy in the choice of the audience that can shame me, 
since respect seems to entail the recognition and admiration of certain values in 
the other. This means that my own values and standards are relevant to my 
shame and play a role in eliciting it. But at the same time, the other is genuinely 
other because it points towards my possibilities in the world, and those are not 
determined exclusively by me. Williams believes that giving respected others the 
power to shame us, even in the cases in which we do not share their opinions, is a 
sign of good moral discernment, because it entails a recognition of the limits of our 
own reason and the need for the help of others. Since, according to Williams, 
reason has its limits and moral truth is indeterminate, giving weight to the 
opinions of others is not incompatible with critical thinking and discernment: it is 
                                                          
34 Williams, Shame and Necessity, 84. 
35 Ibid., 82–89. 
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often a result and an enhancement of them.36 Shame is an acknowledgement that 
we give others that weight. 
Now, Calhoun agrees with Williams in this last point, but she criticizes him for 
not going far enough.37 According to her, his claim that, through respect, we have 
some power to choose the audience that can shame us is not so different from 
saying that in shame I am my own judge, that ultimately the only evaluation at 
play is my own evaluation of myself. This is so, in her view, because respect relies 
on shared values, and if the person I happen to respect betrays them, I would 
typically withdraw my respect.38 In her view, therefore, Williams’ solution means 
that eventually it all comes down to our individual values and norms. It wouldn’t 
be so far away from an account of shame as autonomous, like the one proposed by 
Deonna, Rodogno and Teroni, who claim that the often referred-to 
phenomenology of the gaze of another is a metaphor through which we sometimes 
seek to make sense of shame.39 It is part of some, but not all, instances of the 
emotion, and therefore cannot be a necessary factor for shame to arise. If this is so 
- their reasoning goes - would it not be more natural, and more faithful to the 
phenomenology of shame, to say that I am always the main judge, that the 
standards at play in this self-assessment are my standards? 
Calhoun objects that accounts of this kind, which present shame as 
autonomous, have very undesirable implications when it comes to the shame that 
members of oppressed groups feel before the shaming of their oppressors.40 In her 
view, these accounts cannot explain such instances of shame without implying 
that the oppressed are complicit in their own oppression at some level, or that 
they are morally immature or self-alienated, since they let themselves be 
influenced by external opinions they don’t share or deem respectable. The dubious 
assumption that, in her view, this kind of accounts make is that “no rational, 
mature person who firmly rejects her subordinate social status would feel shame in 
the face of sexist, racist, homophobic or classist expressions of contempt,”41 and 
therefore, those people who do feel it are morally immature. Calhoun thinks this is 
unacceptable, because it shifts from the aggressor to the victim a substantial part 
of the responsibility for the suffering caused. Williams’ account, in her view, has 
the same flaw, for it implies that in this sort of cases the ashamed subject respects 
someone who, in her own view, is not worthy of respect, and thus the suspicion of 
collusion stands. This cannot be right, she claims. Her strategy to avoid this 
problem, while honoring Williams’ insight about the importance of others in our 
moral lives, consists in separating the realm of moral autonomy, reason and 
                                                          
36 Ibid., 100, my emphasis. 
37 Calhoun, ‘An Apology for Moral Shame.’ 
38 Ibid., 134–35. 
39 Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni, In Defense of Shame, pt. one. 
40 Calhoun, ‘An Apology for Moral Shame.’ 
41 Ibid., 136. 
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knowledge from the realm of morality as a practice shared with others. Thus, I 
might recognize that the opinions of others have social weight and have an impact 
on me, because we’re all participants in a shared practice of morality, while 
believing that these opinions are false, that they carry no epistemic weight.42 
Calhoun’s strategy to save the autonomy of oppressed minorities is therefore 
to keep it separate from shame and give shame a different ethical role. When one 
is shamed for belonging to an oppressed group, one might deny the truth of the 
insulting remark, one might deny that the minority one belongs to actually has 
that negative trait, or deny that being a part of that group is a shameful thing, 
and still recognize the negative impact that such evaluations by others have in 
one’s public identities, the power they have in shaping the world one will have to 
live in. That impact is real, and acknowledging it amounts to acknowledging a 
fact about the world and about our public identities, but it does not thereby imply 
that our capacity for autonomous judgment is compromised. 
Now, there are at least two problems with Calhoun’s criticism, one of them 
having to do with emotions of self-assessment, the other with respect. Beginning 
with the latter, one might argue that respecting another person does not have to 
entail agreeing with everything she says, thinks or values. This is clear in debates 
about tolerance. Indeed, the classic liberal way of thinking about tolerance, which 
is an essential attitude to cultivate in a pluralistic democracy, precisely requires 
distinguishing between respecting persons and agreeing with their actions, 
opinions or judgments. Tolerance is supposed to be justified precisely because one 
respects the person, since she is a free autonomous agent, and as such worthy of 
respect, even though one disagrees with her opinions - disagrees to the point where 
those opinions are deeply unpleasant, perhaps even in some sense painful to 
oneself, and yet one maintains one’s respect for the person who holds them. 
Indeed, one tolerates those opinions out of respect.43 With this I do not mean to 
take a position in the debate on tolerance, I simply mean to highlight that there 
are important and widespread views on respect that do not imply agreeing or even 
sharing values with the respected person. They merely imply conceiving persons 
as intrinsically valuable in themselves.  
Judging by Calhoun’s choice of examples, and from the ease with which she 
concedes that one might withdraw respect, it seems to me that she construes 
respect not in the above way, but as something quite close to admiration. 
Admittedly, Williams also choses “role models” as examples of respected persons, 
and so he seems to lean in that direction as well. But if tolerance is thought of as a 
sign or a consequence of respect, I think both Calhoun and Williams go too far in 
approaching respect to admiration: respect is a more neutral attitude than they 
lead us to understand. At this point, one might think that such a notion of respect 
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is too wide to allow us to distinguish audiences that have the power to shame us 
from those that lack it, but I don’t think so. Indeed, the problem with both 
Williams’ and Calhoun’s formulations is that they are too restrictive about who 
can shame us. In a sense, they get things the wrong way around. They seem to 
imply that nobody has the power to shame us unless we give it to them. In my view, 
the reverse is true: everybody has, to a higher or lesser degree, the power to shame 
us unless we withdraw it from them through contempt or disengagement, for 
example.44 The power to shame is not a privilege we accord to certain esteemed 
others, it is a default power we all have over each other to varying degrees in 
social relations, and completely withdrawing it from particular individuals or 
groups is typically an effortful endeavor (with the exception perhaps of some 
pathological cases, like those of psychopathy or other social impairments). 
The second of my criticisms to Calhoun has to do with her way of presenting 
the relation between shame and oppression. The main problem is that she only 
takes into account one of the varieties of shame and other shame-related emotions 
that come into play in resisting oppression and caving in to it. But as Deonna, 
Rodogno and Teroni remark, at least two other notions that Calhoun overlooks 
need to be considered in these cases: humiliation and stigma.45 Distinguishing 
shame from the feeling of humiliation can do part of the work of saving the 
autonomy of oppressed minorities. The feeling of humiliation is different from 
shame in several crucial aspects. First and foremost, it necessarily involves 
another agent, who is trying to downgrade your status vis-à-vis hers. Her actions 
can be extremely violent (torture typically involves systematic acts of 
humiliation), but they need not be: something like refusing to greet you or 
acknowledge your presence can be humiliating. As such, the other’s negative 
evaluation and downgrading of you is typically perceived as unjust and 
outrageous, and the focus of the experience is as much on the humiliated self as on 
the offending other.46 Taking this into account, one can argue that acknowledging 
the practical impact of someone else’s negative evaluation but refusing to ascribe 
any normative weight to it is precisely what we do when we feel humiliated, when 
we feel unjustifiably attacked, accused, offended or put down in the eyes of others. 
Humiliation is a common response to shaming; and some of Calhoun’s examples 
could be described as humiliation.47 But the moment one transitions into shame, 
one seems to be appropriating the negative evaluation on some level, this is why 
shame is considered an emotion of self-assessment.  
                                                          
44 Cf. Hutchinson, ‘Facing Atrocity’ on Diogenes the Cynic. 
45 Cf. Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni, In Defense of Shame, 226–43. 
46 Gilbert, ‘What Is Shame? Some Core Issues and Controversies.’ 
47 Cf. Calhoun, ‘An Apology for Moral Shame’, 137. The example she takes from Adrian Piper, 
in which Piper herself seeks to describe her feelings as ‘groundless shame’, is in my view a good 
example of feelings of humiliation. 
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Indeed, in this type of situations, when we feel ashamed of something we do 
not deem shameful because of pressure from others, it is not rare later to come to 
feel ashamed of one’s own shame, as FitzGerald argues.48 As an example, she uses 
a personal anecdote, where she reports that out of shame anxiety, she lied to a 
group of colleagues about shopping in a discount supermarket, and told them that 
she shopped in a more expensive one. Afterwards, however, when telling the 
anecdote to her partner, she felt ashamed of having allowed her shame anxiety to 
overrule her other values. In other words, she reports being ashamed of her shame. 
This meta-shame can often arise because one interprets the initial shame episode 
as a betrayal of one’s own deeply held values, as a moment of weakness in which 
one momentarily upheld someone else’s wrong values and self-evaluated in terms 
of them. One feels ashamed of having felt unjustified shame, of having caved in to 
external pressure. One feels that one’s own value system has been fleetingly 
contaminated. This is exactly what FitzGerald reports.49 This meta-emotion 
evidences the difference between shame and the feeling of humiliation, and it is 
proof that one felt a contaminating shame in the first place. Imagine a situation 
where, instead of acting like she did, she had told the truth, and someone in the 
group had ridiculed her for her choice of supermarket. She might have felt 
humiliated while enduring the mockery, but she probably would not feel ashamed 
of herself afterwards. This meta-shame suggests that her initial shame, as opposed 
to what would have been the case in humiliation, did evidence a fleeting value 
contamination. 
Since social groups can and do exert high levels of pressure, feelings of 
humiliation often transition into shame, when the other’s negative evaluation 
infiltrates our own. This infiltration can be very fleeting, like in FitzGerald’s 
example above, or more permanent and insidious, as in the case of stigmatized 
groups that are constantly bombarded by stigmatizing messages.50 It is therefore 
important to also look at stigmatization processes and be aware of their capacity 
to infiltrate our values and contaminate our autonomy.51  
It should be noted, however, that the transition need not always be from 
humiliation to shame. As Morgan argues, shame can prompt us to examine our 
                                                          
48 Cf. FitzGerald, ‘“Review Article: Defending Shame”. Extended Critical Review Essay on J. 
Deonna, R. Rodogno & F. Teroni, In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012’. 
49 Ibid., sec. 2. 
50 Cf. Yovel, ‘The Birth of the Picaro from the Death of Shame’; Calhoun, ‘An Apology for 
Moral Shame’, 135–37. 
51 I agree with Calhoun that one should resist accounts that construe members of stigmatized 
groups as morally immature for feeling this type of shame. But the solution is not to separate 
shame from autonomy and construe autonomy as impervious to emotions. A more promising 
route, in my view, is to construe moral maturity differently, as involving something else than 
autonomy and allowing corrections to it when necessary. Cf. Williams, Shame and Necessity, 
100. 
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relations to others, and thus motivate a transition from shame to humiliation.52 In 
the case of a stigmatized group, this transition towards feelings of humiliation 
might be an affirmation of autonomy, but this is not necessarily the case for all 
individuals and groups. In some other cases, responding to shaming with shame 
(rather than humiliation) might be an expression of autonomy too, such as when 
somebody publicly accused of a reprehensible action she indeed performed accepts 
her responsibility and shame. 
In any case, I believe that the right approach to these issues requires 
abandoning the idea that, at least when it comes to emotions, autonomy and 
heteronomy are dichotomous, that this is an all-or-nothing issue, that shame must 
be either autonomous or heteronomous. FitzGerald argues convincingly that it is 
not possible to clearly determine whether the self-assessment of shame is 
autonomous or heteronomous in all cases.53 In her view, autonomy and 
heteronomy come in degrees, and shame is a phenomenon where this becomes 
particularly clear, since it shows that the values of others can infiltrate one’s own 
to varying degrees. 
Thus, so far it seems clear that the role of others in shame is not equivalent to 
heteronomy, because shame can be autonomous, or it can fall somewhere in 
between autonomy and heteronomy. But it seems also quite clear that this is an 
emotion through which others can and do exert some influence on our values. This 
is, arguably, one of the reasons why shame has often been regarded as especially 
conducive to moral learning, as in Aristotle,54 and it is frequently used for 
education purposes, as a tool to instill social and moral norms.55 In this sense, 
shame has even been called the “midwife” and the “condition of possibility” of 
any human education.56 This is also why humiliation and stigmatization can 
become insidious. The question now is whether we need to postulate an 
internalized other to make sense of the influence others can have in our shame. 
 
The other in shame: internalized or constitutive? 
 
Let me now address head-on the issue of the internalized audience. Why postulate 
it? As shown above, Deonna, Rodogno and Teroni are right in pointing out that in 
many cases, one cannot pin down the audience in front of which one is allegedly 
                                                          
52 Morgan, On Shame. 
53 FitzGerald, ‘Review Article: Defending Shame’. Extended Critical Review Essay on J. 
Deonna, R. Rodogno & F. Teroni, In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012’. 
54 Burnyeat, ‘Aristotle on Learning to Be Good.’ 
55 See e.g., Heller, ‘Five Approaches to the Phenomenon of Shame’, 1024; Ferlosio, El alma y la 
vergüenza, 29. 
56 Ferlosio, El alma y la vergüenza, 29. This is not to say that shame should be used as an 
educational tool. I merely mean to register the fact that it can and has been used in this way.  
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ashamed.57 Furthermore, the issue of internalization raises the questions of how 
and when do we internalize this audience, and which audience do we internalize. 
According to the psychoanalytic story, the audience would be our parents and 
main educators, which might be in line with many of the above examples. But 
what about someone who came to severely question and even be ashamed of her 
parents’ values? What if, for example, the racist one is your father and you 
become ashamed of him having such views?58 This gets complicated even further 
by Williams’ requirement that one must respect the audience that gives rise to our 
shame. Does this mean that we internalize all the others we respect? Or a 
representative of all spheres of our lives that significantly shape our identities? 
How many internalized others do we typically have? When do we internalize 
them? Perhaps looking at development can give us some clues to clarify these 
questions. 
According to Freud, shame emerges during the “latency stage” of 
development, between the 3rd and the 7th year of life.59 Modern developmental 
psychologists have pushed this age further back, although there is no consensus 
on a specific age, or on approaches and interpretations of results. According to the 
cognitive-developmental approach to developmental psychology, self-conscious 
emotions such as shame or pride emerge in normally developing infants around 
the second year of life.60 This is so because in the cognitive-developmental view, 
self-conscious emotions are thought to depend on the possession of a concept of 
self. Empirical proof that this concept is in place is linked to the mirror self-
recognition test. Typically infants start to pass this test consistently from the 18th 
month of age onwards, and from then on, supporters of the cognitive-
developmental view start to talk about the onset of self-conscious emotions, such 
as embarrassment, pride, jealousy and shame.61 There is much to discuss here that 
falls out of the scope of this paper, but for my current purposes, it is enough to 
underline that, according to the cognitive-developmental view, the condition for 
self-conscious emotions to arise is a concept of self that allows the child to re-
identify herself from the perspective of any external observer (the image that the 
mirror shows is what others can see of us). 
There is a growing number of developmental psychologists that criticize these 
views, and favor an interactive, second-personal approach instead. With this 
approach, Reddy, for instance, argues that starting from a self-concept gets things 
                                                          
57 Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni, In Defense of Shame, 30–32. 
58 Zahavi, ‘Self, Consciousness, and Shame’, 313, fn. 8. 
59 Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 43, 58; cf. also Metcalf, ‘The Truth of Shame-
Consciousness in Freud and Phenomenology.’ 
60 Cf. Lewis, Shame for a prominent example; Rochat, Others in Mind, 96–98 endorses this view. 
61 Cf. Rochat, Others in Mind, 96–98. 
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backwards.62 In her view, what self-conscious emotions require is self-experience 
and interpersonal awareness (which the infant is capable of from the start), not 
any conceptual abilities.63 In Reddy’s view, interpersonal engagement elicits in 
the infant a very basic sense of self and other (the other person as qualitatively 
distinct from an object), that is tied to the interaction. This basic interpersonal 
awareness is what prepares the ground for a concept of self, not the other way 
around.64 This is also what allows infants to experience self-conscious emotional 
reactions of coyness and showing off, which she documents already during their 
first year of life, sometimes as early as in the second month.65 She doesn’t call 
these reactions full-blown shame or pride (although some others, like Trevarthen, 
have no qualms about attributing shame to 3-month-olds66), but they are its 
precursors and form its experiential ground. The point is that the sense of self that 
is required for shame, the kind of self-consciousness it exemplifies, arises 
immediately in and from the interaction and emotional engagement with others: it 
does not require a stable self-concept independent of the interaction, nor an 
internalized other. Indeed, these things rely to some extent on the sense of self 
that arises out of intersubjective emotional engagement.67 This is why Reddy 
suggests that we call it “self-other-consciousness”, instead of just “self-
consciousness”.68 
All this suggests that the most basic structures that enable shame are social in 
a fundamental way, but they do not rely in any form of internalization. This is in 
line with the Sartrean insight that shame exemplifies a form of self-consciousness 
that is fundamentally different from the minimal pre-reflective form given in the 
first-personal character of experience. As Zahavi explains, there is a minimal form 
of selfhood implied by the fact that experiences are perspectival, they imply an 
experiencer for whom these phenomena are given.69 Sartre’s example is 
illuminating: if I’m crouching at a keyhole to spy on someone, at that point I’m 
completely focused on what I see and hear, and my experience of self is minimal, 
it is implicit in those perceptions as their mode: those experiences are given for me, 
but this for-me-ness is not their focus, it is not part of their content, it is rather 
the mode in which they are given. Now, suppose I hear a noise in the corridor, 
indicating perhaps that another person is approaching, and I’m overcome by 
shame. Now my experience has changed fundamentally: I focus on myself and 
                                                          
62 Reddy, How Infants Know Minds; Draghi-Lorenz, Reddy, and Costall, ‘Rethinking the 
Development of “Nonbasic” Emotions’. 
63 Reddy, How Infants Know Minds. 
64 Ibid., 144. 
65 Ibid., 129–40. 
66 At talks given at the University of Copenhagen and the University of Portsmouth in 2014. 
67 Reddy, How Infants Know Minds, 144. 
68 Ibid., 148–49. 
69 Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood, Investigating the First-Person Perspective. 
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experience myself as an object, the object of someone else’s perception. This is 
what Sartre calls my “being-for-Others”: a fundamentally different form of self-
consciousness that arises from recognizing that there are other subjects in the 
world who can perceive me.  
Sartre’s subsequent development of these ideas is very complex and 
problematic in many ways, but this is no place to engage in such long 
controversies. All I want to highlight is his central idea that engagement with 
others gives rise to a fundamentally different form of self-consciousness, that 
Zahavi and I have previously called social self-consciousness.70 This is the form of 
self-consciousness that is at stake in shame. And according to Reddy, it is present 
in a very basic form from the first weeks of life, when infants are aware and 
respond to others’ attention to them. This does not necessarily entail that shame 
(or pride, for that matter) can only be elicited when other people are present, it 
simply means that in those phenomena, the dimension of selfhood I am focusing 
on is the same that arises out of and is at stake in my engagements with others. A 
solipsistic being would be incapable of shame or pride. In emotions of social self-
consciousness there is a crucial change in my self-experience: I relate to myself 
from the perspective of engagement with others. This does not mean that I need 
to take on any specific person’s attitudes towards or judgments of me, it doesn’t 
mean that I need to imagine a specific audience. It simply means that I focus on 
the dimension of myself that can be perceived from the outside and engaged with. 
Very young infants might only be able to experience it in direct interaction, but 
adults, who do possess a self-concept, can experience it in solitude. This is both 
thinner and more robust that internalization of an audience: it is a background 
constitutive condition, a feature of any self that can experience shame. But it isn’t 
an other with a particular face or an idiosyncratic set of values. It is a condition of 
possibility for “self-other-conscious” emotions to arise. 
Now, this is obviously not all that shame requires. Shame is an unpleasant 
form of social self-consciousness, a form that foregrounds the vulnerability of self 
and the dangerousness of others. Sartre believes that it is more fundamental than 
the pleasant forms, like pride, but it is quite unclear why that should be so, and 
developmental psychology does not support that view. Be this as it may, my aim 
here is not to establish the primacy of shame over pride, or the other way around, 
it is rather to highlight that the social self-consciousness they evidence does not 
require internalization of an audience: it requires the ability to relate to others as 
subjects, which is there from the outset in a very basic form. All emotions of social 
self-consciousness get enriched and complexified through sustained engagement 
with others, to the point where the notion of internalizing an audience might seem 
plausible. The underlying structure, however, is not a product of internalization; 
it is a feature of engagement. What we internalize, or learn, are norms and 
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standards, and facts about the social world and one’s position in it. This makes it 
possible for shame (and guilt, for that matter) to disengage from the direct 
disapproval of others and become a personal self-evaluation, but this does not 
require internalizing the other. The other remains outside, as that which 
constitutes the dimension of self that gets evaluated: the intersubjective self. 
To conclude, I want to return to Williams and his claim that shame includes a 
reference to real concrete others, to the world I want to live in and my possibilities 
in it. I think he is essentially right, but this does not require an internalized other. 
It requires an intersubjective self, i.e., a self that can become aware of a dimension 
of her being that depends on others. In other words, it requires the capacity to 
understand others and relate to them as subjects who can perceive oneself, and to 
understand oneself as an object of their experience, an object who is thereby 
affected and changed. It requires the capacity to experience that my identity, who 
I am, is not fully in my control, but depends on others. As one’s world widens and 
enriches through learning, and one acquires the capacity to project oneself 
backwards and forwards in time, among other things, this enables the kind of 
complex, thick experiences that Williams describes, where Ajax understands he 
can no longer live as the hero he had been and wanted to keep being. The 
experience is concrete and can involve a reference to individual others, but it does 
not require internalization of audiences, just the awareness that who I am does 
not solely depend on me. The heightened shaming power of specific others depends 
on how my world is built, how much I care about them, and how much influence 
they have on the possibilities that matter to me, among other factors. All in all, I 
believe that shame is social in a thin but fundamental sense: in the sense that it is 
only possible for a social being, who is aware that her identity is partially 
dependent on others. But this does not require internalizing others: it requires 
living with and being affected by them. 
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